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ABSTRACT 
We analyse a number of different externalities to identify conceptual 
challenges for the practical implementation of their internalisation. Three 
issues were identified: i) The balance between compensation and 
technology change and the respective effects on the nominal and real GDP; 
ii) The relevance and efficiency of different instruments for internalisation 
and compensation; and iii) Implementing internalisation over large 
geographical and temporal distances. We find taxation to be a more relevant 
and efficient tool for internalisation than insurance and litigation. With 
increasing geographical and especially temporal distance between the 
benefitting actor and the victim of the external cost, the involvement of a 
non-governmental intermediate actor becomes increasingly necessary to 
provide the short-term capital required to ensure a successful 
implementation. 
METHODS  
We analyse conceptually a number of different externalities (impact categories) in order to 
reveal any systematic relationships between the characteristics of the externalities and the 
challenges facing a practical implementation of their internalisation. 
The analysed externalities cover social impacts (missing education, trade barriers, labour 
rights violations), biophysical impacts (emissions of greenhouse gases, toxic substances and 
long-range pollutants), and economic impacts (free-riding on infrastructure, traffic injuries). 
The externalities were classified according to their characteristics:  
• The nature of the externality (e.g. economic costs, foregone income, damage to health, 
damage to nature),  
• The relative size of costs versus benefits, 
• The extent to which the externalities are already monetised (although not internalised) 
• Who bears the cost or receives the benefit, and  
• How these actors are placed geographically, socially, and temporally. 
Based on the analysis results, we assess the applicability and adequacy of different methods 
for internalisation and their dependency on the above characteristics of the externalities. 
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RESULTS 
Our conceptual analysis did not reveal any systematic differences in implementation that 
could be related to the nature of the externalities per se, i.e. whether the impacts were on 
economic, social or biophysical safeguard subjects.  
However, three implementation issues were identified by our analysis: 
• A relationship between the relative size of costs and benefits on the one hand and the 
relevance of compensation for the impact versus technology change to avoid the 
impact on the other hand, and the respective effects on the nominal and real GDP, 
• A relationship between the distance of benefitting actors and victims of costs on the 
one hand and the relevance and efficiency of compensation via insurance and 
litigation versus via taxation and subsidies on the other hand, and the most efficient 
supply chain location for public interventions. 
• The increasing difficulty of implementing internalisation with increasing 
geographically and especially temporally distance between benefitting actor and 
victim of cost. 
These are explained and discussed in the following section. 
DISCUSSION 
The balance between compensation and technology change and the effects on GDP 
In some cases, the costs of an impact clearly exceed the value of the related benefits. In such 
cases, it does not make sense to internalise the cost, but rather to change the technology to 
avoid the impact. All the analysed social impact categories (missing education, trade barriers, 
labour rights violations) fall in this category. Missing education implies lost productivity in 
the future and trade barriers imply lost productivity both now and in the future. Labour rights 
violations imply losses in income and well-being for the workers. The benefits are largely 
cost savings for specific current actors. If the costs (i.e. the lost productivity, income, etc.) 
were to be internalised, the reason for creating the impact in the first place would disappear, 
i.e. there would be no advantage not to provide adequate (economically-optimal) education, to 
maintain trade barriers, nor to violate worker’s rights.  
In the opposite situation, where the benefits of the activity clearly exceed the costs, it makes 
sense to continue the activity even after internalisation of the costs. Examples can be found 
where the elasticity of demand is low, i.e. not sensitive to price changes, as for example 
private car usage (Goodwin et al. 2004, Graham & Glaister 2004). Thus, private car usage is 
likely to continue largely unchanged, even if the costs of traffic injuries were completely 
internalised (today these costs are already partly internalised, and even compensated, through 
insurance payments). 
Between these two extremes we have the situations where internalising the costs will reduce 
the competitiveness of the activity, but not to an extent where it would cease to exist. Some 
users would be willing to pay the increased price, while at the same time we would see some 
users shift to other technologies, including changes in behaviour, and a stimulation of 
innovation.  
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We can illustrate these differences by the effect they have on the nominal and the real GDP. 
Without any changes in technologies and demand, the internalisation of a cost, which was 
previously not paid for, will initially lead to an increase in the nominal GDP, while the real 
GDP does not change (since there was no change in technologies and demand and thus in 
activities). For externalities that are already monetised, i.e. where the costs are already paid 
for by another actor, internalisation would initially not even have an effect on the nominal 
GDP, since this would simply be a re-distribution of the existing costs. An example of the 
latter would be the introduction of road pricing to internalise the free-riding.  
Secondly, the increased cost reduces the competitiveness of the technology and when there 
are attractive alternatives this would lead to a shift to these alternatives and thus an overall 
reduction in the internalised cost. This counteracts to some extent the increase in the nominal 
GDP while the real GDP now increases, due to the economy becoming more efficient. 
Thus, the internalisation of a cost practically always leads to an increase of the GDP, initially 
because the cost previously non-monetised is now monetised and therefore becomes part of 
the GDP, and subsequently depending on the degree of improved economic efficiency 
resulting from the internalisation. This runs counter to the popular idea that a reduction in real 
GDP should be a desirable goal. 
The relevance and efficiency of different instruments for internalisation and compensation 
The relevant instruments for internalisation depend on the distance between the benefitting 
actors and the victims of external costs. For example, the relationship between the benefitting 
actor of road transport and the victims of traffic injuries is very close (too close you may say), 
while the distance between the emitting activity of long-range pollutants and their impacts on 
human health, agricultural yields and the natural environment is very large. In the case of 
traffic injuries, it is possible to internalise the cost via an insurance payment that covers the 
cost of compensating the victims, and the victims can obtain the compensation via litigation. 
Insurance and litigation may also be an option for the impacts from specific, low-mobility 
toxic substances, while the distance between the cause and the damage becomes too large for 
long-range pollutants to make insurance and litigation a realistic option. This becomes even 
more obvious for impacts that take place far into the future, such as those from emissions of 
greenhouse gases). It can be argued that even in the case of traffic injuries, the currently partly 
implemented internalisation and compensation involves too high transaction costs (mainly for 
the litigation) compared to a system of differentiated taxation on road traffic and a public 
payment for treatment, lost income and compensations for mortality and morbidity. With 
larger distance between benefitting actor and the victims of the cost, transaction costs would 
increase and the taxation option becomes even more obvious as the most efficient solution, 
both with and without subsequent compensation of the specific victims. 
A second issue here is where in the supply chain such taxation is most efficiently 
implemented. While it is obvious that a tax or quota on the actual cause for the externality 
will lead to the least confounding or secondary distortions, there are cases where the 
transaction costs of such a direct implementation may be unreasonably high and it becomes 
relevant to look for another place in the supply chain where there are fewer flows or activities 
to be taxed. For example, the administration of a direct SO2 or GHG emission tax will be 
more costly than a tax on the sulphur or carbon content of raw materials at their extraction.  
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Implementing internalisation over large geographical and temporal distances 
With increasing geographical and especially temporal distance between the benefitting actor 
and the victim of the cost, the implementation of internalisation becomes more difficult, 
because the options for the victims to participate and exert pressure on the political process is 
limited or absent, while those currently benefiting from non-internalisation are both likely and 
able to provide opposition. A solution that can be seen as acceptable both to the current 
benefitting parties (who stand to loose from internalisation) and to the distant victims, could 
be one in which the benefit of internalisation is shared with the present-day losers of 
internalisation, so that their loss of benefits is at least partly compensated. Although it may 
seem unfair to take from the victims and give to those causing the impact, the alternative of 
non-internalisation would be even more unfair. The compensation of the present-day losers 
from internalising externalities needs of course to be phased out over a period, if the end-
result is to be a full realisation of the efficiency gains from the internalisation. 
A particular complication occurs when the impact, and thus the benefit of internalisation, lies 
in the future, while the cost of internalisation is immediate. The suggested compensation of 
the present-day losers (of internalisation) requires a transfer of future benefit to the current 
actors. Such long-term transfers can be difficult for governments that generally have a short-
term policy horizon, due to the general opposition to taxation. A solution that avoids the need 
for increasing taxes in the short term would be to employ an intermediate actor that is able to 
provide the capital to compensate the present-day losers while recuperating this expenditure 
from the future benefits. The government would not need to provide payment instantly but 
simply would provide a guarantee of future payment based on the real increase in future tax 
revenue caused by the internalisation. 
Among the analysed externalities several suffer from the distance problem and thus may 
require such interventions. Both greenhouse gas emissions and missing education are 
particularly subject to the temporal distance issue while trade barriers also have an aspect of 
geographical distance and labour rights violations also have an aspect of social distance. The 
proposed mechanism for temporal benefit sharing can also be extended to the geographical 
and social distance issues. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We identified and addressed several conceptual challenges for internalizing externalities. 
Specifically, we identified the distance between the benefitting actor and the victim of the 
cost as having a decisive influence on the instruments necessary for a successful 
implementation. A strong government role is required to ensure the functioning of the 
necessary transfers of benefits. 
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